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I this paper, I introduce an internalist theory of justification which I call restricted 
internalist reliabilism.  The main concern of the theory is to explain when a belief source, 
particularly perceptual experiences, can be a source of justification. I will discuss three 
alternative internalist theories: dogmatism, conservatism and internalist reliabilism and 
discuss objections and difficulties associated with each. I will then argue how restricted 
internalist reliabilism can address many of those objections. Also I present the response 
that each of these theories provide against the skeptic and argue for superiority of 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
My main goal in this paper is to argue for an internalist theory that explains why and how 
a belief source in general, and perceptual experiences in particular provide justification.  I 
call that theory “restricted internalist reliabilism”. Theories such as the one presented in 
this paper help us differentiate the justified beliefs from the unjustified ones and also, not 
less importantly, provide responses to skepticism.  
To argue for restricted internalist reliabilism, I analyze three major alternative 
theories.  I start with the simplest one, dogmatism, and from there I move on to 
conservatism. I discuss problems of dogmatism and conservatism and show why we need 
the next theory: internalist reliabilism. Then I discuss the problems of internalist 
reliabilism and argue for taking the next step to restricted internalist reliabilism. The rest 
of the paper is dedicated to restricted internalist reliabilism. I show how the theory is able 
to solve some problems for which internalist reliabilism and other previously mentioned 
theories have no good answer.  
Before I start, let me make a few clarifications. I have chosen an internalist 
approach in this paper and take knowledge to be un-Gettiered true belief that is justified 
from the subject’s internal perspective. The locution “having justification for a belief” is 
intended to mean “having reasons or evidence for that belief”. By justification, I always 





always be defeated by further evidence. Also I should note that the perceptual 
experiences discussed in this paper all have assertive content i.e. they all represent the 
world in a certain way. Perceptions, however, are not limited to those with assertive 
content. There are other perceptions such as imagination which do not represent the 
world in a certain way. I am not concerned with those perceptions in this paper.  
As said above, one important goal of theories like the one presented in this paper 
is to offer a response to skepticism. So let me also talk a little bit about skepticism and 
the approaches that reject it. Skepticism is not the claim that perceptual beliefs are false; 
they may be true or false. Skepticism merely claims that we cannot have justification for 
perceptual beliefs. The skeptical argument for this claim has been formulated in many 
ways. Let us consider one common simple formulation:  
1- If I have justification to believe I have hands, I have justification to believe 
that I am not a brain in a vat.  
2- I do not have justification to believe that I am not a brain in a vat. 
3- Therefore, I do not have justification to believe I have hands. 
Substituting “J” for “having justification”, “B” for believing and “BIV” for “being 
a brain in a vat” the above formulation can be abbreviated as follows:  
1- J(hands)  J(~BIV)  
2- ~J(~BIV) 
3- ~J(hands) 
Throughout this paper, I will refer to above formulation as the skeptical argument. 





variations generally have the following pattern: To have justification for proposition A, 
we should antecedently have justification for proposition B. To have justification for B, 
we should have antecedent justification for A. Therefore, we neither can have 
justification for A, nor can we have justification for B (Pryor, 2000). 
Philosophers have attacked skepticism from different angles. For example, 
Descartes whose evil demon is the main antagonist of the skeptical play, rejects 
skepticism by referring to God. He argues that we have non-perceptual reasons to believe 
in God, and He would not give us unreliable senses and would not allow a demon to 
constantly deceive us (or equally put our brain in a vat). Therefore, we non-perceptually 
know that we are not being deceived by an evil demon. Others have rejected skepticism 
by claiming a rational presumption that our senses are reliable or claiming that it is a 
priori unlikely that coherent experiences like our perceptual experiences are products of 
an evil demon. All of these approaches have attacked the second skeptical premise that 
we do not have justification to believe that we are not deceived by an evil demon or we 
are not brains in vats without recourse to perceptual experiences. In this paper, I am not 
concerned with these approaches.  For the approaches of concern in this paper, perceptual 







CHAPTER 2. DOGMATISM 
2.1 What is dogmatism? 
Dogmatism (Huemer, 2001; Pryor, 2000) claims ipso facto justification for sensory 
perceptions that means they always provide justification. According to this view, the 
perceptions need not have any specific qualifications and provide justification as they are. 
If I have a perceptual experience of P, then I have some justification to believe P.  
The difference between the doxastic and propositional justifications is important 
for correct understanding of dogmatism. Dogmatism is about propositional justification 
and not doxastic justification. The question of concern is if the subject’s perceptual 
experiences are a source of justification. According to dogmatism, they are.  Whether the 
subject’s perceptual beliefs are justified all things considered is another issue. One may 
have some justification for a proposition but still reject it for other reasons. 
Perceptual beliefs, according to dogmatism, are foundational because perceptual 
experiences are sufficient for their justification and no other belief is necessary. I need 
not believe “it seems to me as if P” and then infer P from that belief. Merely the fact that 
it seems to me as if P is sufficient for giving me justification to believe P. Of course a 
foundational belief formed in this way can have additional inferential justification. But 





Like many other foundational theories, dogmatism gets some support from a sort 
of regress argument. The regress argument in this case says that if we require some other 
meta-beliefs in order to accept justifications by perceptual experiences, then the 
justification by perceptual experiences comes in part from the justification we have for 
those meta-beliefs. The meta-belief can be “My sense perceptions are reliable.” But the 
meta-beliefs should also be justified which requires some meta-meta-beliefs, and so forth.  
Besides the regress argument, there are three other arguments in support of 
dogmatism. First, both Huemer (2001) and Pryor (2000) have claimed that dogmatism is 
intuitive. They claim that introspections shows us that we form perceptual beliefs solely 
and immediately based on our perceptions and no other beliefs is involved in their 
formation. If someone asks “why do you think there is table in front of you?” we simply 
respond by citing our perceptions: “Well, I see there is one!” and consider our response 
adequate. This shows, according to Huemer and Pryor, that we intuitively form beliefs 
based on perceptions without any reference to any other evidence. 
Second, Huemer (2013) claims that dogmatism1 is widely accepted all over 
philosophy. It is the proper practice in any philosophical debate to accept and stick to 
what it seems to be the case until further evidence reject it. This is in fact inherent to the 
any kind of judgment, inferential or non-inferential. What dogmatism claims for 
perceptions is just one instance of this generally accepted principle to stick to what seems 
to be true until further evidence forces you to give it up. Huemer claims that even those 
who argue against dogmatism are committed to this general practice of accepting what 
                                                 
1 He calls it “phenomenal conservatism”. I do not use that term to avoid confusion with 





strikes them as true. If they reject dogmatism, they do so simply because this rejection 
strikes them as true and they have no evidence against it. Thus, when the opponents argue 
against dogmatism they are in fact arguing against the very principle they rely on and 
thus, all they say is self-defeating. They are sawing off the very branch they are sitting 
on.  
Third, Huemer (2001) argues that it is epistemically rational to accept dogmatism. 
Our epistemic goal is to generate true beliefs. Accepting what seems to us to be true 
while we do not have any evidence against it, is the best we can do to serve this goal. 
Therefore, it is epistemically rational to engage in this practice. 
The arguments for dogmatism, Huemer believes, can be extended beyond 
perceptual seemings to include also introspective, intellectual and memorial seemings. 
The extended version of dogmatism states that no matter what kind of seeming I have, if 
it seems to me that P is the case, then I immediately have some justification for believing 
P. Further evidence, of course, may render the belief in P unjustified all things 
considered. But still, the seeming provides me with some justification. For example, if I 
have a memory seeming that I have had lunch and I have no reason to doubt this seeming, 
then I am justified to form the belief that I have had lunch. Or if it rationally seems to me 
that a certain arithmetic formula is correct, then I have some justification to believe that 
formula.  
By such generalization of dogmatism, Huemer (2013) attempts to develop a 
unified theory for epistemology. He says:  
My more recent statements leave open the possibility that PC [phenomenal 





PC holds out the promise of a simple and unified account of the justification of 
our beliefs about the external world, about the past, about the future, about the 
values, and so on. 
Before embarking on Huemer’s odyssey to solve all the problems of the future 
and the past, let us examine our ship, dogmatism, against some breakers of objection. 
 
2.2 Objections to dogmatism 
2.2.1 Why do belief sources provide justification? 
One important objection to dogmatism is that the view fails to explain why a belief 
source, say a perceptual experience, can provide justification (Steup, 2013, 2015). 
Dogmatism does not require any meta-beliefs about the belief sources. We do not have to 
have the meta-belief that the belief sources can in fact provide justification. In absence of 
such meta-beliefs, the belief formed based on a belief source would be accidental from 
the subject’s perspective. For example, the subject does not need the meta-belief “my 
perceptual experiences are reliable sources of justification for my perceptual beliefs”, and 
in absence of such meta-beliefs, dogmatism offers nothing to make the perceptual beliefs 
non-accidental from the subject’s perspective. To better see how those beliefs are 
accidental, consider the following conversation between the subject and the adversary: 
S: There is a couch in front of me. 
A: How do you know that? 
S: I know that because it seems to me that there is a couch in front of me. 
A: Well, do you know that if it seems to you that there is an object in front of you, 





S: No! I do not know this! 
A: Then you do not know that there is a coach in front of you! 
The problem is that the justificatory relation between the perceptions and the 
beliefs formed based on perceptions is not clear in dogmatism. Some other criteria or 
meta-beliefs should be added to dogmatism to clarify this relationship.  
 
2.2.2 Bootstrapping 
Dogmatism allows for a justified belief to be basic. A belief is basic if and only if its 
justification does not even in part comes from any other justified belief. According to 
theories such as dogmatism that allow basic knowledge, the subject S can repetitively use 
her source of basic knowledge to form justified beliefs about the world while she does 
not have evidence for the reliability of that basic source. Each time S forms a justified 
belief in this way, she also acquires a piece of evidence showing that her source of basic 
knowledge produces correct propositions about the world. These pieces of evidence 
accumulate to eventually convince S that her source of basic knowledge is indeed, 
reliable.  
In the case of dogmatism, S can acquire knowledge through her perceptions while 
she does not have any evidence for their reliability. Each time, however, she also acquires 
a piece of evidence that her perceptions are operating reliably. At a certain point, she has 
acquired enough evidence to claim her perceptions are reliable. This pernicious practice 
is called bootstrapping and many philosophers agree that is illegitimate (Cohen, 2002).  
One possible response refers to the maximum reliability the subject can in this 





acquired by bootstrapping can actually provide some evidence for the reliability of the 
source of knowledge. Nevertheless, this evidence acquired by bootstrapping cannot 
increase the maximum reliability of the source from what we already had before 
bootstrapping. The maximum reliability we can have is bounded with what we started 
with. For example, suppose we have a measurement device which is validated with some 
external standards. The validation gives the device some degree of reliability. Assuming 
that the device is reliable, we use it to for our measurements. In spite of the fact that we 
consider all these measurements as valid and correct, they cannot increase the reliability 
of the measurement device above the degree of reliability it has obtained from validation.  
This response cannot save dogmatism and the measurement device example is 
misleading. According to dogmatism, evidence of reliability is not needed at all and we 
can have justification based on a seeming for which we have absolutely zero evidence of 
reliability. Justified beliefs formed by this source, however, provide some non-zero 
degree of justification for the reliability of the source. No matter how small this 
additional evidence is, it is greater than the zero evidence we started with.  
One may continue the line of the above response and claim that beliefs formed by 
sources for which we have zero evidence of reliability cannot provide justification for 
that belief source. But claiming that the justified beliefs formed by such a source cannot 
provide any justification of reliability amounts to counting those beliefs as unjustified. 
Otherwise, why can they not provide justification for reliability? If dogmatism counts 







2.2.3 Counterexamples from testimony 
We generally do not trust testimonies before we have some evidence for their reliability. 
The contents of a book, for example, do not provide us any new information unless we 
have evidence that the book is reliable. The same is true about sources such as gauges 
and instruments. My thermometer does not tell me the temperature unless I have some 
evidence that I can trust it. In fact, painstaking efforts are made in scientific enquiries to 
ensure the reliability of measurement devices before trusting their output. Any result 
generated by devices and measurement procedures that are not first validated is counted 
as useless and unreliable.  
If we require evidence of reliability for all sources of information, it is not clear 
why we should give our perceptual experiences or other seemings a higher epistemic 
status and exempt them from the requirement. Our sensory organs which are the sources 
of these perceptual experiences are not fundamentally different from physical sensors and 
spectroscopic devices after all. Some reliability validation, therefore, is required for the 
perceptions they generate.  
 
2.2.4 Counterexamples from optical illusions   
Figure 1 shows the well-known Muller-Lyer illusion. In this illusion, the top horizontal 
line looks longer than the bottom one, when in fact they are of equal length. Nevertheless, 
even after verifying that the two lines have equal lengths by measurement, the top one 
still looks longer. The question is whether this seeming gives us any justification to 






measurements by a ruler, we are in general not justified to believe the top line is longer, 
but still the seeming provides us with some justification.  
It is not clear, however, why a seeming which we know is merely an illusion can 
provide any justification whatsoever and the dogmatic response seems to be 
counterintuitive. The dogmatist cannot say that we have some perceptual justification, but 
that justification is defeated by further evidence. We are fully aware that this seeming is 
not reliable and does not represent reality and hence, cannot be a source of any 
justification.  
An even more convincing case of optical illusion is shown in figure 2. This figure 
is only a colorful painting on a piece of paper. It is obvious that nothing rotates in this 
picture and everything is completely fixed. Nevertheless, we have this illusionary 
seeming that the wheels are rotating. It is not clear why the seeming that the wheels rotate 
can provide any justification that the wheels are actually rotating, when we are sure that 
this seeming is merely an illusion. 
 
2.2.5 Seemings with bad sources 
An objection closely-related to counterexamples from optical illusion is the objection that 
some seemings have bad sources. We humans often have seemings that originate from 
epistemically invalid sources. For instance, some proposition may seem true to us merely 
because we desire that proposition to be true. Dogmatism, however, ignores this fact and 
allows the contents of any seeming to be justificatory. By not requiring any qualifications 
for the seemings based on which we can form beliefs, dogmatism allows seemings with 






advocates, for the seemings of invalid sources suspending judgement serves the epistemic 
goal of coming at truth much better than forming beliefs.  
Several examples have been constructed to represent this objection. In each, the 
source of the seeming is invalid in a certain way. Here I present only one of these 
examples given by Markie (2013). 
Imagine two prospectors, one experienced and one novice. Both of the 
prospectors have found a piece of nugget which is in fact gold and to both, the nugget 
they have found seems to be gold. However, the source of this same seeming is different 
for the experienced and the novice. The experienced prospector possesses an extensive 
experience of identifying golden nuggets and based on that experience, the nugget looks 
gold to him. But the novice lacks this experience. Instead he happens to have a very 
strong desire for wealth and the nuggets look like gold to him merely due to his extreme 
lust for money. One may argue that in this scenario, while the seemings of the expert 
confer justification on his belief that his nugget is gold because it seems gold to him, the 
novice does not have justification to believe that his nugget is gold although he has the 
same seeming. 
Huemer (2013) defends dogmatism against such cases where seemings are caused 
by unreliable mental states like desires or unjustified beliefs, by identifying three possible 
scenarios. In the first scenario, the subject S is aware that her appearances come from the 
source M and is also aware of the unreliability of M. Here, dogmatism tells us that S has 
some justification from the appearances but also has a defeater and thus, cannot form 
beliefs based on her appearances. In the second scenario, the subject S is aware that her 






hard to imagine such a case, but if possible, S has some justification for her belief. In the 
third scenario, the subject S is not aware of the source of her appearance. Here again, 
Huemer claims that the subject has some justification for her beliefs. Dogmatism is an 
internalist account after all and is concerned with whether the belief is justified from the 
subject’s perspective. If the subject does not know about the unreliability of the source, 
then the unreliability is not related to her justification. 
The above response, however, misses the point that the seemings of the novice 
prospector are epistemically without value and do not have justificational force in the 
first place. The effective formulation of the objection is not concerned with showing that 
one of the prospectors is not justified to believe his nugget is gold. Instead, it aims at 
showing that the novice prospector’s seeming is not a source of justification because it is 
discredited as unreliable. There is considerable chance that our seemings come from 
unreliable sources and hence, we need evidence for their reliability before the seemings 
can provide us with any justification. In other words the effective formulation of the 
objection targets propositional and not doxastic justification. The objection tries to show 
that we cannot ipso facto trust our seemings because we often have seemings with bad 
sources.  
 
2.3 Dogmatism and Skepticism 
Dogmatism rejects the second premise of the skeptical argument which states that we do 
not know that we are not a brain in a vat. If the skeptic asks the dogmatist how she knows 






ipso facto justifies me to believe that I have hands. If I have hands, then I am not a brain 
in a vat.”  
In this way, dogmatism rejects the skeptic’s requirement that to acquire perceptual 
knowledge certain skeptical alternatives should be ruled out antecedently. We do not 
need to know we are not a brain in a vat or are not deceived by an evil demon to be able 
to form perceptual beliefs. We can simply ignore those alternatives since we do not have 
any positive evidence for those alternatives. Until the skeptic provide use with good 
evidence for the skeptical alternatives we simply ignore them.  
The skeptic can argue that we already have good evidence for the skeptical 
alternatives. We can think about those alternatives and observe that the world would be 
mentally exactly as it is if those alternatives were the case. This, the skeptic argues, is 
enough evidence to make us worry about them. But dogmatism demands more in order to 
consider skeptical scenarios. Merely the idea and hypothetical possibility of such 
scenarios is not enough. We should have positive tangible evidence. For example, 
Huemer (2001) says he would consider being a brain in a vat if he sees a tape on his 
vision reading “You are a brain in a vat!” The skeptic can hardly ever be able to bring 
this type of evidence to support her scenarios. 
 
In short, the dogmatic response to the skeptic is that I have hands, therefore I am 
not a brain in a vat. This dogmatic response, however, is not adequate. The skeptical 






hand; I cannot respond: because they are! It would be a clear case of question begging2. 
The failure to provide an appropriate response to the skeptical argument and the 
objections listed above are, in my view, enough to refute dogmatism and require more 
from a source of justification. The next immediate step is conservatism. 
 
                                                 
2 Cohen (2002) nicely explains this point by an example. I am in a shop with my son to buy a red 
table. I see a red table and say: “Look! Here is the red table!” But my son asks whether I am sure that the 
table is really red, and it is not white but illuminated with red light. I cannot respond “I know it is really red 






CHAPTER 3. CONSERVATISM 
3.1 What is conservatism? 
According to conservatism, perceptions are sources of justification if and only if the 
subject does not have memorial data or some other evidence of their unreliability (Steup, 
2004). As long as she does not have such evidence, the content of her perceptions 
provides her with justification. No other prior justification or meta-belief about 
perceptual experiences is needed. They are considered innocent unless proven guilty and 
the subject does not have to worry if her perceptions are reliable until she acquires some 
evidence indicating their unreliability. In cases in which one lacks evidence for or against 
their guilt, perceptions are considered innocent. Of course perceptual justifications 
acquired from these innocent sources are defeasible and the subject’s other beliefs and 
perceptions may defeat them. But still, they provide some justification. Conservatism, 
therefore, adds a negative condition to dogmatism. Dogmatism requires no conditions at 
all and holds that seemings are a source of justification no matter what. Conservatism, on 
the hand, requires that the evidence of unreliability must be absent.  
Conservatism can be supported by almost all of the arguments in support of 
dogmatism. For example, it finds support from the regress argument, and one can also 






is epistemically rational to accept conservatism as it serves the epistemic goal of forming 
true beliefs. At the same time, conservatism resists some of the objections against 
dogmatism. For example, the optical illusions that are important objections to dogmatism 
do not work against conservatism. In those cases we have evidence for the unreliability of 
our perceptions and therefore, they do not provide justification. However, conservatisms 
faces some of the same objections raised against dogmatism such as the justification 
being accidental from the subject’s perspective, plus a number of other objections, as 
discussed in the next section. 
 
3.2 Objections to conservatism 
3.2.1 Why do belief sources provide justification? 
Conservatism is much stronger than dogmatism in explaining why a belief source 
provides justification. Dogmatism has no explanation at all, but conservatism says that a 
belief source can be a source of justification because we do not have evidence of its 
unreliability. Nevertheless, this response is still insufficient and cannot fully explain the 
justificatory power of the belief sources. Merely being aware that there is no evidence 
against reliability of some belief source, does not mean that that belief source is reliable. 
When one lacks positive evidence that a belief source is in fact reliable, the justification 
that that belief source provides remains accidental from the subject’s perspective. This 
point becomes clear in the following conversation between the subject and the adversary: 
S: There is a couch in front of me. 






S: I know that because it seems to me that there is a couch in front of me and I 
have no evidence that this seeming is deceiving me. 
A: Well, you have no evidence that your seeming is deceiving you, but do you 
have any evidence that it is not deceiving you? 
S: No! I do not have any evidence that my seeming is not deceiving me, I merely 
do not have evidence that it is. 
A: Therefore you cannot reject that your seeming may be deceiving you. Is that 
correct? 
S: It is correct! I have no reason to think that my seeming is deceiving me, but I 
cannot say that it is not. 
A: Therefore you do not have justification to believe there is a couch in front of 
you as your seeming may be deceiving you. 
The problem here is that not having evidence against reliability is different from 
having evidence for reliability, and only the latter can explain why a belief source can 
provide justification. Lack of evidence for unreliability does not establish a meaningful 
justificatory connection between the belief source and what it justifies.  
 
3.2.2 Bootstrapping 
Similar to dogmatism, conservatism also allows basic knowledge and therefore, is open 
to bootstrapping. If we do not have evidence against the reliability of a belief source and 
the source, say one of our senses, provides us with some seemings, conservatism allows 
forming justified beliefs based on those seemings. The justification for that belief does 






Bootstrapping threatens theories of justification such as conservatism, that allow basic 
knowledge (Cohen, 2002).  
Conservatism allows forming a basic perceptual belief even in absence of positive 
evidence for the reliability of perceptual experiences. The perceptual belief formed in this 
way provides some justification for believing that our perceptual experiences are reliable. 
These pieces of evidence for reliability accumulate and at certain point provide 
justification for believing in the reliability of perceptual experiences. As explained with 
more details in 2.2.2 for dogmatism, starting with zero evidence of reliability, we end up 
with evidence of reliability for our perceptual experiences based on beliefs formed by the 
same experiences. I am sympathetic with many philosophers who find this unacceptable 
(Cohen, 2002).  
 
3.2.3 Counterexamples from testimony 
Suppose that one day on your way to work you find a book somewhere on the street. You 
pick up the book out of curiosity and you find out that it reports numerous cases of 
unicorn sightings. You do not have any evidence that the book is unreliable and therefore, 
if you are a conservatist, you have justification to form the belief that unicorns exist3. The 
story, however, does not end here. While reading the strange book, suddenly a gentleman 
whom you have never met comes to you and tells you that your boss has just fired you a 
minute ago and therefore, you do not need to go to work today. You do not have any 
evidence that the testimony of this gentleman is unreliable and therefore, according to 
                                                 
3 Here, one should also ignore any background evidence one might have that reports of unicorn 
sighting are generally unreliable. The possibility of such background evidence was pointed to by Professor 






conservatism, you have justification to accept his word. You do not need to go to work 
anymore and can sit somewhere and continue reading the book and get more justification 
to believe in unicorns. 
The example above intends to show that mere lack of evidence against reliability 
is not enough for a testimony to provide justification. We do not trust a testimony, unless 
we have positive evidence of its reliability. The testimony of a book does not provide us 
with justification until we have some evidence that the book is reliable. For exactly the 
same reason, the words of some random person on the street do not provide us with 
justification. This is exactly the reason that scientists first calibrate and validate their 
experimental devices against some standards before trusting their measurements. Mere 
lack of evidence that a device generates false values is not enough. 
 
3.2.4 The problem of evidential neutrality 
Cases of evidential neutrality are those cases where either we do not have evidence for or 
against a belief, or our evidence for and against a belief are of equal power. In such cases, 
it is rational to suspend judgment. Nevertheless, conservatism allows one to have justified 
belief in such cases. Two examples by Steup (2004) described below clarify this problem 
and are intended to put pressure on conservatism. 
In the first example, the inhabitants of the balanced evil demon world have equal 
evidence for and against the reliability of their senses. Intuitively, the inhabitants of this 
world do not have justification for perceptual beliefs based on their sensory perceptions. 






justification based on what seems to them to be the case according to their sensory 
perceptions.  
One may argue that the balanced evil demon world is not an effective scenario as 
the assumption of an equilibrium point between reliability and unreliability is not a 
rational assumption. Once a perceptual faculty generates false results, it loses its 
reliability without passing any equilibrium point. So we have only two situations: either 
we do not have evidence against reliability of a faculty, or we have evidence against its 
reliability. The balanced evil demon world, therefore, may not pose a serious threat to 
conservatism. 
Another more compelling example of evidential neutrality is the example of the 
echolocation device. Assume the faculty of echolocation is surgically implanted into the 
brain of a blind subject. She is told that there is no guarantee that the faculty would work 
well and there is only a fifty percent chance that it works properly. In the first experiment 
after the surgery, the subject senses a table in front of her with her newly acquired faculty 
of echolocation. Is she justified in believing that there is actually a table in front of her? 
Conservatism implausibly says yes, she is justified. In this example, trusting the faculty 
of echolocation is similar to trusting the testimony of a source without having any 
evidence for its reliability.  
Steup’s example of the echolocation device has very important implications. 
Consider a newly born baby. The first time the baby opens his eyes, he is exactly in the 
same position as the subject of the echolocation device example. The baby has a faculty, 
vision, for which he has no evidence of reliability. If we accept that the subject in the 






then we have to also accept that the baby cannot justifiably form beliefs based on her 
vision. This is a serious problem for conservatism and opens the interesting question of 
what the baby needs in order to be justified in forming beliefs based on her faculty of 
vision. This observation is a good ground to move to the next theory: internalist 
reliabilism. But before doing that, let us consider if conservatism can provide a 
satisfactory response to the skeptical argument.  
 
3.3 Conservatism and Skepticism 
Conservatism’s response to skepticism is similar to dogmatism. According to 
conservatism, our perceptual experiences provide us with justification because we do not 
have evidence against their reliability. Therefore, seeing my hands, I am justified to form 
the belief that I have hands. Now if I have hands, I am certainly not a brain in a vat. This 
rejects the second premise of the skeptical argument, which says that I do not know that I 
am not a brain in a vat and thus, prevents the skeptical conclusion.  
With respect to the conservative response to skepticism, I side with many 
philosophers who believe this argument is merely begging the question (Steup, 2004). If 
someone asks me that how I know that I have hands if I do not know that I am not a brain 
in a vat, I cannot respond that I have hands and therefore I know I am not a brain in a vat. 







CHAPTER 4. INTERNALIST RELIABILISM 
4.1 What is internalist reliabilism? 
What do newly born babies or subjects with an experimental echolocation device lack? 
Why can they not rely on their faculty of vision or echolocation to form justified beliefs? 
What they lack, Steup (2004) argues, is positive evidence for the reliability of their 
faculties. This evidence comes in the form of a memory data of success of the faculty. 
Obviously, the subject has to also have evidence for the reliability of her memory. 
According to internalist reliabilism perceptual experiences are sources of justification if 
and only if the subject has undefeated evidence, in the form of memorial impression, of 
the reliability of her memorial and perceptual experiences. 
What motivates internalist reliabilism is its ability to explain the justificatory 
power of a belief source such as our perceptual experiences. Internalist reliabilism states 
that we have perceptual justifications because we have evidence that our perceptions are 
reliable sources of justification. It is because of this evidence of reliability that the beliefs 
justified by such sources are not accidental from the subject’s perspective. This means 
internalist reliabilism has an answer for one of the most important objections against 
dogmatism and conservatism. Unlike the justification by dogmatism and conservatism, 






Remember that Pryor and Huemer conclude from the fact that everyday 
perceptual beliefs are formed solely based on perceptual experiences that perceptual 
experiences are intuitively enough for justification. When we are asked about the reasons 
we have for those beliefs, we simply cite our perceptions and do not mention any other 
qualifications and conditions. Therefore, positive evidence of reliability is not needed. 
Internalist reliabilism responds that in our everyday conversation the reliability 
conditions are there but they are not mentioned because they are simply taken for 
granted. We do not need to mention the reliability conditions because we have assumed 
them. Not openly mentioning those conditions does not mean that they are not important. 
Internalist reliabilism has to explain how one can establish the reliability of one’s 
perceptions. For that, internalist reliabilism relies on memory impressions. We have a 
long track record of our perceptions being reliable. We remember that whenever we have 
identified an object in front of us, the object was actually there, and it rarely happens that 
we have a sensory experience but nothing generates that perception. Also, we can 
remember that different sense experiences verify one another. We remember that we can 
touch an object we see in front of us and the details that our touch identifies verify the 
details suggested by our vision. Even more, we have experienced that our perceptions can 
be relied on to work on objects. For example, we remember that we have visually 
identified two pieces of puzzles to match, and they actually matched when we put those 
pieces together. Every day we deposit a rich amount of evidence for the reliability of our 
perceptual faculties to our memory. This rich memory track provides ample justification 






One may object that internalist reliabilism’s method of establishing the reliability 
of perceptual faculties is a clear instance of bootstrapping. We accumulate perceptual 
evidence to support the reliability of perception. But internalist reliabilism has a good 
response to this objection. Perception is used as a general term here and consists of a few 
different faculties which provide cross evidence for each other. I can touch what I see and 
hear what I touch. Therefore the evidence for the reliability of a source does not 
necessarily come purely from that source.  
Yes, it is true that a faculty supports itself indirectly by supporting other faculties. 
Nevertheless, this indirect support should not be seen as a vicious circularity and does not 
lead to bootstrapping. Rather, the evidence for reliability should be looked at as a 
coherent web of memories of perceptual propositions all supporting each other. This 
coherent web of memorial evidence generates a higher-order seeming in us that we can 
trust our perceptions. We do not need to form the belief that our perceptions are reliable. 
The seeming of reliability is enough. Internalist reliabilism merely requires the evidence 
for reliability to be there in the subject’s mind. The perceptual justification does not rely 
on any explicit beliefs and therefore, can be regarded as basic or foundational. Internalist 
reliabilism forgoes the reliability belief in order to remain safe against Bergmann’s 
objection to strong internalism (Bergmann, 2006; Steup, 2013). Bergmann’s objection 
will be discussed in the following section. 
A view closely related to internalist reliabilism is holistic foundationalism 
suggested by Cohen (2002a)4. In this theory, the subject S first forms beliefs about the 
                                                 
4 In discussion of Cohen’s view, I use the term “Knowledge” to be consistent with Cohen’s own 
language. However, this paper is concerned with justified belief and knowledge in this discussion should be 






world based her sensory perceptions. These beliefs, however, are not instances of 
knowledge because S has not yet established the reliability of their sources. Gradually S 
acquires enough beliefs to eventually form a coherent system, in which all beliefs support 
and provide grounds for each other. Once S forms this holistic system, then she is in the 
position to believe that her sensory beliefs are formed by reliable sources. It is only then 
that her sensory beliefs transform into knowledge.  
Cohen allows unintellectual beings such as animals or children to acquire justified 
belief by their sensory perceptions without forming the holistic system of beliefs. For 
that, he uses Sosa’s term “animal knowledge” that is a sort of knowledge in which the 
subject does not form beliefs about the reliability of the knowledge sources. Cohen 
claims that animal knowledge is not closed. Also, instances of animal knowledge cannot 
be combined individually for inference and therefore, bootstrapping cannot happen.  
Steup’s internalist reliabilism differs here from Cohen’s holism. Steup believes 
that children quickly develop the required coherent web of evidence that their perceptions 
are reliable. Therefore, their justified beliefs are the same as the justified beliefs of the 
grown-ups. However, justification comes in degrees. A newly-born baby has less 
justification compared to her ten-year old brother although her justification is not of a 
different type.   
 
4.2 Objections to internalist reliabilism 
4.2.1 The problem of vicious infinite regress 
There are two versions of internalism, weak and strong. According to weak internalism, 






beliefs are required. Strong internalism, however, requires the subject to not only be 
aware of her reasons, but also to form the meta-belief that these reasons actually support 
her belief. Bergmann proposes separate objections to weak and strong internalist 
positions and thus, makes a dilemma for internalism (Bergmann, 2006; Steup, 2013). The 
question is whether internalist reliabilism falls victim to any of Bergmann’s objections.  
Bergmann’s objection to weak internalism is that, if the subject does not have any 
justified meta-belief that her reasons for a belief in fact support that belief, then the belief 
formed based on those reasons would be accidental from her perspective. I have already 
explained in the previous section that internalist reliabilism provides a good response 
here by relating the justificatory power of a belief source to a subject’s evidence for its 
reliability. I think, therefore, that the objection to weak internalism is not effective against 
internalist reliabilism. Let us now look at the objection to strong reliabilism.  
For a belief P to be justified based on strong internalism, we need to satisfy two 
conditions: having undefeated reasons supporting P, and holding a belief that our reasons 
can justify P. Bergmann points out that a belief about the justificatory power of our 
reasons needs to be justified itself. This second justification should in turn satisfy the two 
aforementioned conditions of strong internalism. The second condition of this second 
round of justification, in turn, needs to be justified and satisfy the two conditions. This 
trend results in a vicious infinite regress.   
As mentioned above, internalist reliabilism forgoes requiring beliefs about the 
reliability of one’s perceptions. If the subject has a long track memory of cases where 
what seemed to her to be the case was actually true, then she is justified to hold beliefs 






record generates a higher level memorial seeming that the subject’s seemings are actually 
reliable. The important point is that the subject need not engage in such a memory 
reflection and does not form the belief that “my seemings are reliable.” Nevertheless, 
deep in her mind she has such reliability data stored and this, Steup argues, is enough to 
make her beliefs based on her seemings non-accidental. Formulated this way, internalist 
reliabilism is not so weak to allow beliefs of the subject to be accidental from her own 
perspective and also is not so strong to result in a vicious regress. It is somewhere 
between the two problematic ends. 
By forgoing the belief requirement, Steup provides a good answer for Bergmann’s 
objection to strong internalism. But this is not the end of the story. There is another 
version of this objection brought up by Huemer (2013) which aims not at belief about 
reliability, but at reliability seemings or having justification for reliability. Huemer argues 
that if we do not require evidence for the reliability of memories, then why should we 
require such evidence for perceptions? If we do require evidence for reliability of 
memories, then we should note that the reliability of any memory seeming can be 
established by referring to other memory perceptions. Then, we need to go on and 
establish the reliability of those reliability-generating memories by some other memories. 
This line will lead to an infinite regress. For example, assume that I have memories that 
my vision has never betrayed me and has been always accurate. This memory track 
provides me with evidence for reliability of my vision. Now what justifies me in relying 
on my memory track of accuracy of my vision? I have to refer to some other memories of 
mine that my memory about vision has always been reliable. At this point one may ask 






ever. Huemer, therefore, suggests that at some point we need to stop asking for evidence 
of reliability. He suggest that we stop asking for such evidence from the very beginning 
at the level of perceptions.  
Huemer’s version of the objection is also not effective. Huemer has assumed a 
linear relationship between justifications and thus, has ignored an important aspect of 
internalist reliabilism. Internalist reliabilism is a coherentist theory which looks at 
justificatory relationships not as a line, but as a web5. Therefore, internalist reliabilism 
simply replaces the infinite regress with loops and circular relations. Memories and 
perceptions are all sources of justification and the subject has a track record of evidence 
of their reliability in the form of a coherent web. This coherentist approach is effective 
against the infinite regress. However, it generates other objections which are discussed 
below. 
 
4.2.2 The problem of circularity 
Evidence for the reliability of perceptions come from memory. We remember that any 
time one of our perceptual faculties presented us with a proposition, we have been able to 
verify that proposition by other perceptions or by the testimony of other people. This 
generates a thick coherent web of evidence in our memory that our perceptions are 
reliable. But, as Huemer points out, we also need to make sure that our memory is a 
reliable source of justification. How can we establish the reliability of memory? The best 
we can do is to refer to memory itself and claim that we remember that our memory has 
                                                 
5 Coherentism used to refer to the position that only beliefs can justify beliefs (Lemos, 2007). This 
is not what I mean here by coherentism. Coherentism here refers to viewing the justificatory relationships 






rarely betrayed us. But using memory to show the reliability of memory results in a 
source circularity with arguably unacceptable consequences. If we allow referring to a 
source to show the reliability of that source, then what can prevent us from showing the 
reliability of an unreliable source such as a crystal ball by referring to the crystal ball 
itself? 
Steup (2013) accepts that this circularity is inevitable in internalist reliabilism.  
However, he believes that this source circularity is not necessarily problematic. In case of 
basing the reliability of a crystal ball on the crystal ball itself, he argues that the problem 
is not the circularity, but the unreliability of the crystal ball to begin with. We already 
know that a crystal ball is an unreliable source. Therefore, we cannot cite its outputs to 
establish its own reliability.  The case is different, however, when it comes to memory 
which is not generally considered to be an unreliable source. 
Let’s set crystal balls aside and examine Steup’s response with a benign source of 
justification. Suppose that an experimental memory chip is surgically implanted into the 
brain of a subject. The subject suffers from severe Alzheimer’s and she has no reliable 
memory of her own. She entirely relies on the memory chip for memory perceptions. 
Unfortunately for her, the subject is told that there is no guarantee that the chip will work 
properly. It may work properly and save real data, or it may fail and present her with 
false memories. A few days after the surgery the subject remembers many different 
things including that the chip has never presented false data to her. Can she refer to this 
memory datum as evidence that the chip is in fact reliable? I believe she cannot.  
This example is dangerous for internalist reliabilism. The memory of a newly-






may be reliable or unreliable from her own perspective. Like the case of the memory 
chip, it is hard to see how the baby can establish the reliability of her memory by 
referring to her memory data. The example of the memory chip shows that if we start 
with no clue about the reliability of memory, we cannot cite memory perceptions to 
establish its own reliability. Accumulation of memory data also does not solve the 
problem. No matter how much data the memory chip generates, it cannot establish its 
own reliability all by itself. We start with zero evidence and therefore, I believe allowing 
memory data with unestablished reliability to show the reliability of memory is an 
instance of vicious bootstrapping and should be avoided. 
 
4.2.3 Objections to coherentism 
Internalist reliabilism is both a foundationalist and a coherentist theory. Therefore, the 
question arises of what resources internalist reliabilism has to respond to standard 
objections to coherentism. The first objection is isolation from reality. Coherence 
happens inside the subject’s mind after all and the subject may form a completely 
coherent web of beliefs that have no connection to reality. If coherence is enough, the 
subject has justification to believe those propositions. I believe internalist reliabilism is 
immune to this objection because of its foundational part. According to internalist 
reliabilism, perceptual experiences are reliable sources of justification for their 
propositional content. These perceptual experiences connect the coherent web of 
internalist reliabilism to reality, therefore, the coherent web is not isolated. 
The second objection says that many alternative theories can be equally coherent 






imagine is a skeptical scenario, say being a brain in a vat. Internalist reliabilism, however, 
argues that a skeptical scenario is not as coherent as the realistic scenario. The brain in a 
vat scenario is not coherent with the current technologies that do not allow brain 
envatment and the fact that there are no reports of any brains in vats. This skeptical 
scenario is also not coherent with the perfect continuity of our perceptions with no 
blackouts and random failures. I believe similar accounts can be made for other skeptical 
scenarios. One, however, needs more investigation to be able to claim that one has 
exhausted all possible alternatives and has not found an equally coherent set of beliefs. 
This means that the objection is valid in theory but one may hope that it would not affect 
internalist reliabilism in practice.  
Third, forming a coherent web of beliefs is an ongoing process. The total 
coherence of a belief system gradually grows up until it reaches a point that the system 
can be called coherent. But where is this point? Coherence does not have a tangible 
measure and it is hard to set clear and universal criteria for identifying a set of beliefs as 
coherent. This lack of clarity makes it hard to differentiate the reliable sources from the 
unreliable ones. For example, it is not clear at what point a baby has acquired enough 
evidence to be able to claim reliability of his perceptions and form justified perceptual 
beliefs. Similarly, it is not clear why a fortuneteller cannot claim a coherent system by 
citing a few cases where her crystal ball has shown her the truth. I believe that internalist 
reliabilism does not have a satisfactory answer to this objection. But this is a problem for 
any coherentist theory and it is not specific to internalist reliabilism.  
Fourth, coherentist theories do not tell us what justifies relying on coherence as a 






within a coherent system which confer justification, but this is not a good response. Not 
any set of beliefs is coherent and this shows that coherence itself is a distinguishable 
meta-property of a belief set. I think it is this property of coherence and not the beliefs in 
a coherent set that confer justification. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask why coherence 
can confer justification.  
Some have argued that coherence itself justifies the belief that coherence is a 
source of justification (Cohen, 2002). According to this view, at the beginning we do not 
even know that coherent systems can reliably produce knowledge. But gradually, we 
come to this understanding by accumulating a coherent set of beliefs. This response is 
also not good. It is not clear which set of propositions can show the reliability of 
coherence. Even if we identify such a set, how can coherence show its own reliability 
when we do not know that it is a legitimate source of justification? The objection thus, 
remains to be answered by all coherentist theories including internalist reliabilism. 
Internalist reliabilism is an important step forward from conservatism. It solves 
many problems such as the arbitrariness of justificatory relations and the problem with 
closure. Nonetheless, the problem of circularity, the threat of bootstrapping and the 
deficiencies inherent to coherentism cause problems for the theory. Internalist reliabilism 
also faces another serious problem from indubitable perceptions which will be discussed 
later in this paper (see section 5.2.1). All these show that we need to modify internalist 
reliabilism. I suggest one possible modification: restricted internalist reliabilism. Before 







4.3 Internalist reliabilism and skepticism 
Internalist reliabilism explains why a belief source can provide justification for the belief 
it justifies and because of this explanation, it provides a much more satisfactory response 
to skepticism compared to dogmatism and conservatism. According to internalist 
reliabilism, the belief source provides this justification because of the evidence for its 
reliability. This explanation provides an effective response to the skeptical argument by 
ruling out all the possible disguises and tricks of skeptical scenarios and hence, rejecting 
the second skeptical premise. According to internalist reliabilism our perceptual 
experiences are not sources of justification unless we have good evidence that we are not 
victims of a skeptical scenario. This means that when we have justification by internalist 
reliabilism, we have first provided a solid response to the skeptic.  
This is in contrast with dogmatism and conservatism, which simply ignore the 
skeptical scenarios and thus, provide nothing but question begging when their advocates 
attempt to respond to the skeptic. Internalist reliabilism on the other hand, gives the 
skeptical scenarios their due consideration and rejects them by appealing to evidence for 
reliability. However, it is questionable whether internalist reliabilism can provide the 
evidence for reliability that is needed to effectively rule out the skeptical scenarios.  
Let us consider the brain in the vat scenario. If we were brains in vats, we would 
have exactly the same perceptual experiences. How can internalist reliabilism provide 
evidence of reliability for perceptions against this scenario? An internalist reliabilist 
would argue in a coherentist way. First and most importantly, she refers to her thick 
memory data of cross validated evidence of reliability for her perceptions. She has 






that her perceptions have often been verified by other individuals. Based on this thick 
memory data, it seems to her that her perceptions are reliable. She has also a memory 
impression that her memory has served her well and her memory seemings are generally 
reliable.  
Regarding the envatment, the internalist reliabilist would say that the current 
status of technology is far behind the point that makes envatment a real possibility and 
there has been never any reports of brains in vats. She can validate this claim by referring 
to respectable brain surgeons and neuroscientists. Therefore, she would argue that she has 
coherentist evidence of reliability for her perceptions that rejects the brain in the vat 
scenario. 
I believe the internalist reliabilism’s response to skepticism is far better than that 
of dogmatism and conservatism. Instead of begging the question, internalist reliabilism 
attempts to bring a positive argument against the skeptic. However, there are important 
objections to the theory which make some modifications necessary. Restricted internalist 







CHAPTER 5. RESTRICTED INTERNALIST RELIABILISM 
5.1 What is restricted internalist reliabilism? 
Internalist reliabilism requires positive evidence for reliability. Restricted internalist 
reliabilism requires evidence for reliability most of the time, but not always. To qualify a 
belief source for providing justification, restricted internalist reliabilism requires evidence 
against the unreliability which is accessible to the subject. Lack of any accessible 
alternatives, makes a belief internally indubitable from the subjects’ perspective and 
evidence of reliability is not required anymore. Therefore, internalist reliabilism states: 
A perceptual experience is a source of justification for S only if S has evidence 
against defeaters that are accessible to S. 
In this way, restricted internalist reliabilism relaxes the evidence of reliability 
requirement for one type of perception: the indubitable. Restricted internalist reliabilism 
is further clarified in the following sections and the reasons for this relaxation and some 
specifications of dubitable and indubitable perceptions will be discussed. 
 
5.1.1 A thought experiment: the story of a newly born baby 
Let’s engage in a thought experiment and analyze the case of a newly-born baby, what 






baby starts having perceptions very soon after birth. Pre-birth perceptions can hardly 
provide the baby with any evidence of reliability and thus, are irrelevant to the current 
discussion. Right after birth, the baby has no evidence that her senses are working 
properly. But this does not stop her from using those senses and relying on them to form 
perceptual beliefs. Are these beliefs justified? From an internalist point of view, I believe 
they are. A baby is not yet an intellectual being. Understanding and considering skeptical 
scenarios are beyond her mental abilities. Even if someone tries to present those scenarios 
to the baby, she will not understand them and she will not be able to consider them. 
These perceptual experiences are the only evidence she has and therefore, internally, she 
is justified to form beliefs based on her perceptual experiences. She is justified to form 
those beliefs because the absence of any alternative scenario has rendered those 
perceptual beliefs indubitable from the baby’s standpoint.  
Let me stop here and point out how restricted internalist reliabilism is different 
from conservatism. Although conservatism also allows justified perceptual beliefs for 
babies, it has a different approach. Conservatism claims that even after considering the 
skeptical alternative, these scenarios do not defeat one’s perceptual evidence unless she 
has good evidence for those scenarios. The mere mental availability of a skeptical 
possibility is not enough and positive evidence is needed e.g. in form of a tape on one’s 
vision saying “you are a brain in a vat!” I do not agree with conservatism. I believe the 
mere hypothetical possibility of skeptical alternatives is enough to cast doubt on our 
perceptions. Once we have mental access to the skeptical possibilities, we need evidence 
of reliability as internalist reliabilism requires. The reason that I allow the baby to form 






that the skeptical alternatives are not available to her at her primitive stage of mental 
development. If those scenarios were somehow magically available to the baby, she then 
would not be justified in forming perceptual beliefs. Luckily enough, the scenarios are 
not available to her. 
This account is also different from internalist reliabilism. Internalist reliabilism 
claims that the evidence for reliability is always needed even in the case of the baby. 
According to internalist reliabilism, such evidence can be acquired quickly after birth and 
the web of reliability evidence becomes coherent enough very soon. Therefore the baby’s 
perceptual beliefs are justified because she has evidence for reliability. But I do not see 
how a newly-born baby can start generating any justified perceptual propositions that can 
then build a track record of the relevant type of memories. Internalist reliabilism seems to 
go towards a dangerous bootstrapping which uses propositions generated by a belief 
source for which we do not have any clue of reliability to establish the reliability of that 
source itself. Also it is not clear how soon the coherent web of memorial evidence is 
formed to justify baby’s perceptual beliefs. 
To avoid all these problems, I suggest that the baby can acquire perceptual 
knowledge without evidence of reliability. The reason the baby does not need evidence of 
reliability is that unreliability is not even a hypothetical possibility for her. She does not 
have even a clear understanding of the concept of reliability. Why does she need 
evidence to establish a concept which she does not understand? There are many concepts 
in the universe that are beyond our grasp. Is there any reason that we have to consider all 
those concepts to form a simple justified belief? If we have to, we have to give up 






The baby starts acquiring justified perceptual propositions without any evidence 
of reliability since reliability is not yet an issue for her. But the situation changes over the 
years. She eventually possesses a good deal of evidence that induce her with the seeming 
that her perceptions are reliable. By the time that she is able to consider the skeptical 
possibilities, she can rely on this seeming to support the reliability of her perceptions. 
 Cohen (2002) adopts a view which is very close to the approach I described 
above, but has one important difference with it. Cohen advocates holism which is very 
similar to Steup’s internalist reliabilism. Nevertheless, when it comes to babies’ 
perceptual knowledge he deviates from Steup’s approach. Steup believes that babies very 
quickly develop a sufficiently coherent web of evidence which supports the reliability of 
their perceptions. Cohen, however, allows some time before this evidential web is 
formed. Until then, he believes babies have a type of knowledge which is different from 
the “intellectual knowledge” the grown-up have. He uses Sosa’s term “animal 
knowledge” as a label for the type of knowledge that babies and animals have and 
explains that it is of a different epistemic status compared to the regular knowledge that 
we, the grown-ups, possess. I, however, do not differentiate between the types of 
knowledge that a baby and an adult possess. It is not true that a baby lacks a piece she 
needs to form fully justified knowledge. Yes, she lacks evidence of reliability, but she 
does not need that piece at all to form justified beliefs. The skeptical alternatives are not 
present in her internal world and therefore, she does not need an evidence to reject them. 
Thus, from the internalist perspective, the baby has all she needs and her beliefs can be 






of the claim is that we do not need evidence to eliminate possibilities that are completely 
absent from our mental world.  
5.1.2 An objection to the case of newly-born babies and its response  
One may argue against restricted internalist reliabilism on the grounds that the reliability 
of the baby’s perceptual experiences decreases as she grows up despite the fact that she 
has acquired more and more evidence for their reliability6. For the newly born baby, the 
perceptual experiences are indubitable. For adults, however, the perceptual experiences 
are certainly not indubitable, although they possess far more evidence of reliability. On 
the face of it, this may look counter intuitive, but I believe it is totally benign.  
Suppose that you have come up with a mathematical model for an observation by 
a complicated proof. The mathematical model has been successful in predicting the 
results in many experiments and this has reassured you that your model is correct. One 
day, however, a bright mathematician knocks on your door and suggests a theoretical 
problem in your proof. Although, he cannot fully convince you, he leaves you with a 
profound doubt about the theoretical grounds of your theory. At the same time that you 
are pondering on the theoretical possibility of an error, your lab continues generating 
results consistent with the mathematical model. After the conversation with the 
mathematician, you are less certain that your model is actually correct. Yet, it does not 
prevent the experimental results from providing evidence for the reliability of your 
model. Every day you get more evidence of reliability for your model, but you can never 
be as certain about it as you were before talking to that mathematician. 
                                                 






The case of the newly born baby is exactly the same. Before considering the 
skeptical scenarios, the perceptual experiences are indubitable from the baby’s 
perspective. The baby grows up and develops mental abilities until one day, she thinks 
about the skeptical scenarios. Theoretical consideration of skeptical scenarios lessens the 
reliability of her perceptions and renders them dubitable. However, by then the baby has 
acquired a coherent web of evidence for the reliability of her perceptions. Therefore, 
although her perceptual experiences are not indubitable anymore, they are still reliable. 
 
5.1.3 An example from ethics 
It is often useful to bring examples from ethics to clarify epistemological concepts and I 
think the same strategy can be helpful here. To make an ethical decision, I need to 
consider all the relevant factors. I consider all the factors that I can possibly think of and 
make an ethical decision. But maybe there is one other important factor, of which I could 
not have any knowledge. It is simply beyond my reach. This factor, if considered, may 
completely revert my ethical choice. I, unaware of that factor, go ahead and make a 
decision. Can someone blame me for my decision on the ground that I did not consider 
that factor? Of course not! The factor has not been accessible to me and I cannot be 
blamed for not considering it.  
Similarly, if I form a belief and I do not consider possible defeaters which I have 
no means of being aware of, my belief cannot be marked as unjustified. The inaccessible 
defeater is irrelevant to my justification for my belief and I do not need to reject it. The 
belief formed without considering inaccessible defeaters is epistemically virtuous. The 






alternatives, those alternatives cannot render her beliefs unjustified. She has to form 
beliefs based on what is accessible to her which in her case, are perceptual experiences.  
 
5.1.4 Two types of sources of justification: the dubitable and the indubitable 
While we can readily cast theoretical doubt on almost all sensory perceptions, we can cite 
some introspective and intellectual perceptions that seem to be beyond doubt. For 
instance, when we feel that we are sad by introspection, it seems obvious to us that we 
really feel sadness. Similarly, it is hard to see how we can doubt the intellectual 
perception that x + 1 is greater than x.  
Of course, indubitability of introspective and intellectual perceptions is not 
universal and there are cases of incorrect intellectual and introspective beliefs7. 
Nevertheless, through strict simplification and fixation in time8 we can generate 
introspective and intellectual perceptions that are beyond doubt. For example, if I feel 
happy, I can say without doubt that "it seems to me that I feel happy now." I add the part 
"it seems to me" to be immune to psychoanalytic objections and I fix the proposition in 
time to avoid relying on memory. To be further immune to possibility of misclassification 
of one’s emotions, let us modify our indubitable statement to “it seems to me that I have 
this feeling now” and point to the internal state instead of naming it9. To generate 
                                                 
7 For instance, suppose that I do a certain act for two different reasons but I am actively aware of 
only one of those reasons. Someone asks me about all the reasons I have for my action. I engage in an 
introspection and report the reason which I am aware of and thus, give a wrong introspective response. 
Also, suppose a mathematician who has proved a certain proposition but, unbeknown to him, there is an 
error in his proof. He has an intellectual perception that the proposition is proved, but in fact his perception 
is wrong (Pryor, 2000). 
8 I got the idea that simplification and fixation in time can generate infallible propositions through 
discussions with Professor Matthias Steup. 
9 The possibility of misclassification of one’s emotion was first suggested by Professor Matthias 






indubitable intellectual perceptions I may not even need the fixation in time as many of 
the intellectual concepts are timeless. For example, the proposition “something either 
needs a cause for its existence, or it does not need a cause for its existence” seems to me 
to be timelessly beyond doubt.  
Although we can more or less easily generate indubitable introspective and 
intellectual perceptions, it is hard to imagine an indubitable sensory perception except in 
the cases of babies and animals as I explained above. The very moment a reflective 
subject becomes aware of the skeptical scenarios, her sensory perceptions all become 
dubitable. I do not agree with dogmatism and conservatism that the mere hypothetical 
possibility of the skeptical scenarios is not enough to cast doubt on perceptions. I side 
with internalist reliabilism that the mere hypothetical conjecture of skeptical scenarios is 
enough to make perceptions dubitable and requires the reflective subject to have positive 
evidence for the reliability of her sensory perceptions.  
I believe what makes a proposition of any type (intellectual, introspective or 
sensory) indubitable, is the absence of any legitimate alternatives even in theory. We 
regard some proposition as indubitable, when no prima facie rational alternative is 
internally available to us. The lack of alternatives can be due to logical absolute 
elimination of all the alternatives, or the inability to entertain alternative theories. If we 
have only one hypothesis, then that one hypothesis would be indubitable. Assume a 
world in which only three people live. One of the three is a detective and one of them is 
murdered. It is not hard to find the murderer and no further evidence is needed.   
This concept can be demonstrated using epistemic probabilities. Roughly 






perspective in terms of probabilities. It is a measure of the degree of belief that the 
subject ought to have given her epistemic situation. Indubitable propositions have 
epistemic probability of one. Probability of one or hundred percent certainty means that 
the subject has no doubt about the proposition and is hundred percent certain from her 
perspective that the proposition is true. Let us see what this probability of one means.  
Assuming that epistemic probabilities roughly follow the rules of mathematical 
probability, let us take recourse to the mathematical concept of probability. An “event” is 
defined as a collection of a number of possible outcomes, and “sample space” is defined 
as the collection of all possible outcomes. An event, therefore, is a subset of the sample 
space. The probability of an event then, equals the number of outcomes associated with 
that event divided by the total number of possible outcomes, i.e. the size of the event set 
divided by the size of the sample space. The probability of one means that the size of 
sample space equals the size of the event. The possible outcomes comprising that event 
with probability of one, cover the whole sample space and there are no possible outcomes 
other than what is already present in the event. In other words, there is no alternative to 
an event with probability of one. Figure 2 represents this concept using a Venn diagram. 
Epistemic probability of one can be defined similar to mathematical probability of 
one. In this way, epistemic probability of one means that a proposition covers the whole 
propositional sample space available to the subject (figure 3). There is no alternative to 
that proposition from the subject’s perspective. Any proposition that exhaust all the 
sample space has probability of one and thus, is certain and indubitable. It is certain that 
(A&B)v(~A&B)v(A&~B)v(~A&~B) is true because it covers the whole sample space. 






cause for its existence” has epistemic probability of one, I simply report that these two 
options exhaust all possible options hypothetically available to me and there are no other 
alternatives. When I say that "it seems to me that I have this feeling now" has probability 
of one, I imply that there is no alternative to this proposition about what it seems to me 
introspectively at this time. The term “indubitable” describes this concept very well as it 
implies that there is no way that one can doubt these propositions. 2+2=4. Any other 
number except 4 seems arbitrary to me and I cannot imagine any legitimate alternatives. 
It is not that the answer can be either 4 or 5 and I find 4 more probable. The answer can 
only be 4. It is, therefore, indubitable from my perspective that 2+2=4.  
For an internalist theory of justification, propositional sample space is defined as 
all the propositions that are internally available to the subject. Propositions that are 
beyond the reach of the subject are not part of the sample space as defined in the 
internalist way. The propositional sample space of each individual therefore, is unique to 
that individual and is only a subset of all the propositions that are hypothetically possible. 
The epistemic probability is defined with respect to this internal sample space of each 
individual. Therefore, only those propositions that are mentally accessible to that 
individual are important in determining the epistemic probabilities from her perspective. 
The above concept clarifies why perceptual beliefs are indubitable from the 
newly-born baby’s perspective. The propositional content of perceptual experiences 
cover the whole propositional sample space of a newly-born baby. When she sees a toy in 
front of her, she has no epistemic option but to form the belief that the toy is in fact in 
front of her. It is thus, indubitable from her perspective that the toy is there. This is not, 






space of the father is far wider than the baby’s. He can easily imagine a skeptical 
scenario, say being a brain in a vat, and the content of his perceptual experiences do not 
cover his whole propositional sample space. The toy being in front of him is therefore, 
dubitable from his perspective. Figure 3 shows this situation with Venn diagrams. Note 
that the father’s sample sapce is not covered even by the sum of the BIV and “There is a 
toy” options as he has also other alternatives which are not shown in the figure. The 
larger area of “There is a toy” shows that he sees that option as more probable comapred 
to the BIV scenario.  
One may argue that even when the subject has no access to alternatives, those 
alternatives, if any, are there. Because of the possibility of alternatives that we may not be 
aware of, we can never be sure that the hypotheses we have already considered exhaust 
the propositional sample space. Consequently, we can never have epistemic probability 
of one10. To respond to this objection, I emphasize again the internalist perspective of 
restricted internalist reliabilism. For an internalist theory of justification all that is 
important is whether a belief has justification from the internal perspective of a subject. 
Hence, alternative options which are internally inaccessible to the subject do not matter. 
The subject may not have the mental capacity to entertain certain concepts or those 
concepts may be inaccessible to him due to some external social, geographical or 
historical factors. Thus, the internal propositional sample space of a subject may be much 
smaller than the real sample space. Nevertheless, the internal sample space is all that 
matters for an internal theory of justification.  
                                                 







5.2 Comparison of restricted internalist reliabilism and internalist reliabilism 
5.2.1 The indubitable perceptions and internalist reliabilism 
The type of indubitable perceptions described above are an essential part of restricted 
internalist reliabilism. However, they cause a serious problem for internalist reliabilism. 
The problem is not that they are beyond doubt and the evidence for their reliability seems 
redundant. A redundant additional piece of evidence does not really hurt. The problem is 
that we cannot cite any memory evidence for the reliability of those utterly reliable 
perceptions. This results in the conclusion that according to internalist reliabilism, our 
most certain seemings cannot provide justification. 
For introspective perceptions, any memory evidence we bring would be viciously 
circular and rely on the very proposition in question. For example, someone asks how I 
can be sure that my perception of "it seems to me that I am sad now" is a reliable 
perception. I respond "because whenever it has seemed to me that I was sad at some 
moment, it was actually seeming to me that I was sad at that moment." But I am just 
repeating my claim and obviously, repeating a claim does not make it more justified.    
It is also impossible to bring memory evidence for indubitable intellectual 
propositions. Let us consider the example: “something either needs a cause for its 
existence, or it does not need a cause for its existence”. Someone asks for memory 
evidence supporting the reliability of this intellectual perception. I respond: “I remember 
that whenever it has seemed to me that something either needed a cause for its existence, 
or it did not need a cause for its existence, it has been true that something either needed a 






my claim and it does not provide any justification for the claim. Also it is hard to see how 
memory can provide any justification for the type of intellectual proposition presented in 
this example. Moreover, I am supporting a timeless concept with memory by saying 
“whenever …” How can a timeless intellectual concept be supported by memory which is 
totally time-based?  
If we accept internalist reliabilism and require memory evidence for the reliability 
of indubitable perceptions, then we must give up justificatory power of the most obvious 
of our perceptions because we do not have memorial evidence for their reliability. 
Restricted internalist reliabilism can solve this problem by holding that if reliability of a 
perception is indubitable from the subjects perceptive, she has justification based on that 
perception without needing any evidence for its reliability. This allowance saves the 
legitimacy of justifications provided by the indubitable perceptions for which we do not 
have evidence of reliability. 
 
5.2.2 Objections to coherentism 
I discussed four problems that arise from the coherentist aspects of internalist reliabilism 
in section 4.2.3. I argued that internalist reliabilism can respond to two of those four: the 
problem of isolation from reality and the problem of equally coherent alternative sets. 
Restricted internalist reliabilism can provide the same answers as internalist reliabilism 
does to these two problems. Let us examine restricted internalist reliabilism against the 
other two remaining problems which I believe internalist reliabilism cannot solve.  
 The first problem is the question of why we should trust coherence as a source of 






coherent system, what can then establish the reliability of coherence itself? Fully 
coherentist approaches have no choice but to claim that it is the coherence that establishes 
its own reliability. I argued before that this is not a plausible response. Restricted 
internalist reliabilism, however, may provide a foundationalist response to this question. 
One may claim that we the human beings have an indubitable intellectual perception that 
a coherent set of propositions can be a reliable source of justification. If someone has 
such an indubitable perception, then she can go on and rely on coherence.  
It may be argued that doubt about coherence is accessible to us and therefore, the 
justificatory power of coherence is dubitable. I disagree that this doubt is immediately 
accessible. However, we should investigate the matter deeper. Note that the claim in 
question is not that any coherent set is justified. Rather, the claim is that the fact that 
coherence provides some justification may be considered as indubitable.  
Let us examine an example which suggests indubitable justification for 
coherence. Suppose that we have two sets of beliefs which have corresponding elements 
that are equally justified if compared one by one to each other all by themselves. One of 
these sets, however, is coherent and the other set is not. One can argue that it is 
completely obvious and therefore, indubitable that the elements of the coherent set have 
more justification due to their coherence compared to the elements of the other set. 
However, even if someone is sympathetic to the obviousness of this observation, she 
cannot necessarily conclude that the justificatory power of coherence is indubitable. To 
establish indubitablity of justification for coherence, one needs to show that it is the only 
legitimate alternative. If any other alternatives are possible, no matter how improbable 






Moreover, a counterexample can be constructed against the indubitablity of 
justification by coherence. Suppose the same two sets as described in the previous 
example, but this time assume that all elements of both of the sets are completely 
unjustified. If one knows this fact, can she claim that the coherent set is somewhat more 
justified? Can coherence of knowingly unjustified propositions provide any justification? 
I believe that both of the sets in this example have zero justification and coherence cannot 
provide any justification. It is hard therefore to show that the justificatory power of 
coherence is indubitable.  
The second problem is the ambiguity of the coherence threshold needed for 
justification. Once we understand why we can trust a coherent set, we should ask when a 
set of propositions can be considered as coherent. At this time, I do not have an idea how 
restricted internalist reliabilism can solve this problem. I find no legitimate indubitable 
perception that can help us out. Nevertheless, the problems of the justificatory power of 
coherence and the ambiguity of the coherence threshold are shared by all coherentist 
theories and do not arise specifically from restricted internalist reliabilism. Internalist 
reliabilism for example, faces the same problems. Restricted internalist reliabilism solves 
some of the problems of internalist reliabilism, but not all of them.  
 
5.2.3 The problem of circularity 
I discussed how circularity is a problem for internalist reliabilism. I used the example of 
the implanted memory chip to show the implausibility of establishing the reliability of 






own reliability results in an unacceptable source circularity in internalist reliabilism. 
Here, I analyze restricted internalist reliabilism against this problem.  
Not all of our memory perceptions are the same. They come in a spectrum. On 
one end of the spectrum are the memory perceptions which are vague, weak and doubtful. 
I have, for example, some vague idea of how my mom’s grandfather used to look. On the 
other end of the spectrum stand some other memory perceptions which are clear, definite 
and beyond doubt. For example I have no doubt that my name is Hamed. In the middle 
we have memory perceptions with wide range of varying uncertainties. We have all 
experienced this range of uncertainty while taking exams. We quickly remember some 
responses, have doubts about some and do not remember some other at all.  
Memory impressions which are weak and vague are in fact not reliable. 
Therefore, I do not see why we should seek evidence for their reliability and try to prove 
for them a quality which they do not have. On the other hand, the relative reliability of 
strong memory impressions and what is in the middle can be shown by referring to other 
memories because we have justification for the general reliability of memory. To 
establish the general reliability of memory, restricted internalist reliabilism may suggest 
that the memory impression that memory is generally reliable is indubitable and thus, one 
does not need evidence for its reliability. Once one accepts this meta-memorial 
perception as indubitable, then she can justify other memories by memories. However, it 
may be obvious that memory has generally served us well, but it does not mean that it is 
necessarily indubitable. 
Restricted internalist reliabilism may not be able to fully solve the problem of this 






especially in case of baby’s perceptual beliefs. To see this superiority, let’s re-examine 
the example of the memory chip, this time against restricted internalist reliabilism. The 
subject, who has no memory of her own, is told that the memory chip installed in her 
brain may or may not be reliable. Now, after the surgery, the patient has a memory 
perception generated by the chip. Even if this memory perception is strong and clear, the 
subject can easily doubt it due to her prior knowledge that the memory chip may be 
unreliable. Those memory perceptions are therefore, dubitable. As the subject lacks 
evidence for the reliability of those dubitable memory perceptions, she cannot rely on 
them. So the theory gives us the intuitively correct response. Up to this point, restricted 
internalist reliabilism is not significantly different from internalist reliabilism. Internalist 
reliabilism requires evidence for reliability in all cases and as the subject does not have 
evidence for reliability of the memory chip, she cannot form beliefs based on the memory 
impressions it generates.   
In my previous analysis of this example, I said that according to internalist 
reliabilism the newly-born baby is in the same position as the subject of the memory chip 
surgery. The baby has just started using her memory and does not have evidence for its 
reliability. Therefore, the baby can also not rely on her memory. Note that internalist 
reliabilism depends on reliability of memory impressions for its evidence of reliability for 
perceptual experiences. If the baby does not have reliable memories, she also does not 
have reliable perceptual experiences. The problem of reliability propagates.  
However, while the baby and the subject of the surgery are the same from the 
internalist relibilism’s perspective, they are different from the restricted internalist 






developed the intellectual capacities to consider the possibility of the unreliability of her 
memories. Therefore, strong memorial perceptions are indubitable from her perspective 
and she can use them to generate justified beliefs. The theoretical possibility of 
unreliability, however, is available to the subject of surgery. Therefore, the memory chip 
seemings are dubitable from her perspective and, unlike the baby, she needs evidence of 
reliability. Restricted internalist reliabilism thus, produces the intuitive response and 
separates the case of the baby from the case of the subject of surgery.  
 
5.3 Restricted internalist reliabilism and skepticism 
The simple concise version of the skeptical argument goes as follows: 
1- J(hands)  J(~BIV)  
2- ~J(~BIV) 
3- ~J(hands) 
If I have justification that I have hands, then I have justification that I am not a brain in a 
vat (BIV). But I do not have justification that I am not a brain in a vat and by modus 
tollens, I do not have justification that I have hands.  
Dogmatism, conservatism and internalist reliabilism all reject the second premise 
of this argument that we do not have justification that we are not BIV. Dogmatism claims 
that our perceptual experiences provide us with justification that we have hands and this 
is enough to have justification that we are not BIV. Conservatism, claims that our 
perceptual experiences provide us with justification that we have hands until we have 
evidence that they do not. If we have justification that we have hands, we have 






requires positive evidence in the form of memory seemings that our perceptual 
experiences are reliable. This positive evidence of reliability provides us with 
justification that we are not BIV. All of the three theories, therefore, attack the second 
premise. Restricted internalist reliabilism, however, has more in its arsenal.  
For the dubitable sources of justification, restricted internalist reliabilism rejects 
the skeptical argument in the same ways as internalist reliabilism. Like its predecessor, 
restricted internalist reliabilism requires positive evidence of the reliability for the 
dubitable sources in the form of memory perceptions of reliability as discussed above. 
Part of this evidence is having justification that one is not a BIV. In other words, our 
dubitable perceptual experiences provide us with justification only if we have some 
evidence against the skeptical alternatives.  
The case, however, is more complicated for the indubitable belief sources for 
which, restricted internalist reliabilism does not require evidence for reliability. I 
previously argued that not only requiring evidence of reliability for indubitable sources is 
redundant, but also it leads to absurdities in some cases.  
To clarify how the indubitable belief sources are immune to the skeptical 
argument even in absence of evidence for their reliability, we need an expanded version 
of the skeptical argument as follows: 
1- [J(hands) & J(hands~BIV)]  J(~BIV) 
2- ~J(~BIV) 








The first premise of this expanded version is the closure principle and states that if 
I have justification that I have hands and I also have justification that having hands 
entails not being a BIV, then I have justification that I am not a BIV. Although some 
have argued against closure (Dretske, 2005), it is generally regarded as an 
unobjectionable principle (Cohen, 2002; Hawthorne, 2005).  
The rest of the argument is based on the first premise. Given the closure principle, 
if one does not have justification for not being a BIV, then one has to accept that one 
does not have justification for having hands. In the case of the indubitable perceptions, 
we do not have positive evidence of reliability and therefore, we cannot claim that we 
have justification for not being a BIV. The only option seems to be rejection of the 
closure principle.  
Restricted internalist reliabilism, however, does not reject the closure principle. 
Instead, the theory claims that J(hands  ~BIV) and ~J(~BIV) are irrelevant to subject’s 
justification because of their internal inaccessibility for the subject and their complete 
absence from the subject’s internal perspective. For example, in the case of the newly-
born baby, the baby has justification for having hands by her indubitable perceptions. 
These perceptions, however, do not provide the baby with justification that she is not a 
BIV because she does have any idea what a BIV is. BIVs are totally absent from her 
mental world. Not being a BIV thus, is not associated with and is not entailed by having 
hands from the baby’s perspective and therefore, J(hands  ~BIV) and ~J(~BIV) are 
meaningless statements and irrelevant to her justification. If these statements are 






In this way, for indubitable perceptions restricted internalist reliabilism accepts the 
closure principle but rejects the skeptical argument formed based on this principle.   
Transposing the above argument to the concise three step version of the skeptical 
argument, we should say that restricted internalist reliabilism rejects the first premise of 
the skeptical argument for indubitable perceptions. We saw before that restricted 
internalist reliabilism rejects the second premise in the dubitable cases. Therefore in 
summary, restricted internalist reliabilism has two responses for the skeptic. In case of 
the indubitable belief sources, the theory argues that the skeptical alternatives are 
irrelevant and can be ignored and thus, the first premise of the skeptical argument does 
not hold. In the case of the dubitable belief sources, the second premise of the skeptical 
argument is rejected by positive evidence for reliability similar to internalist reliabilism. 
Using two different strategies, restricted internalist reliabilism provides a much stronger 
response to the skeptical argument, compared to dogmatism, conservatism and internalist 








CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I analyzed three internalist accounts of justified perceptual beliefs: 
dogmatism, conservatism and internalist reliabilism. Analyzing the objections to each 
account, I showed how one should move from dogmatism to conservatism to internalist 
reliabilism. Then I showed that we also need to move from internalist reliabilism and as 
the next step, I suggested an alternative account: restricted internalist reliabilism. 
Restricted internalist reliabilism differentiates between dubitable and indubitable 
perceptions and requires evidence of reliability for the former but not the latter. I showed 
how restricted internalist reliabilism can solve some important problems of internalist 
reliabilism such as justified perceptual beliefs of babies, lack of memorial reliability 
evidence for indubitable belief sources and some cases of the circularity problem. I also 
argued that restricted internalist reliabilism can provide a much more satisfactory 
response to the skeptic compared to all other alternatives discussed. 
Although restricted internalist reliabilism solves some of the problems of 
internalist reliabilism, it cannot solve them all. Some of the objections to internalist 
reliabilism, for instance some objections to the coherentist nature of the theory, retain 
their force against restricted internalist reliabilism. Nonetheless, restricted internalist 
reliabilism is immune to many of the problems of previous theories and, as far as I know, 







































Figure 2: an optical illusion. 
Everything is stationary in this picture 


















Sample Space A Sample Space B 
Figure 3: A) An event with probability of less than 
one, B) An event with probability of one. The area 






















Propositional sample Space A B 
There is a toy There is 
a toy 
Figure 4: A) The propositional sample space of the baby 
is covered by the propositional content of her perceptual 
experience. B) The father has more propositional options and 
therefore, his propositional sample space is not covered by the 
propositional content of his perceptual experience.  
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